

Plato

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Introduction

I had been reading Plato's works for quite a while, in particular in the John Rylands University Library in Manchester during June and July 2006 when I read *Crito* until 27 June, *Phaedo* 28 June, *Cratylus* 1 July, *Theaetetus* 4 July, *Sophist* 6 July, *Politicus* and *Parmenides* 14 July, *Philebus* 17 July and *Symposium* 20 July. After that I had to go away from Manchester, and so the reading was discontinued.

I wrote in my note on 14 July 2006, 'my $\infty \equiv 1 \equiv 0$ a rediscovery!' Then, 'my God a Superset a rediscovery!' I had discovered these on my own through my search and research. But my research must have been influenced much by Plato's works, so unknowingly I had arrived at my ideas through his influence.

Thinking that my understanding was something new and worth telling people about I was serious enough to write and submitted papers to philosophical journals, namely *God the Superset* to *Journal of Theological Studies* on 2 November 2005, then to *Philosophy Journal* on 8 December 2005. And then, seeing nobody accepted articles on my pet little discovery, I submitted it again to *The Nation* newspaper in Bangkok. Still until now no one has shown an interest to publish my works on the subject.

The realisation through reading Plato that everything was a rediscovery came as a relieve. I then realised that my articles would not have been necessary, and definitely was no longer needed. Therefore I left everything behind and began a series of pilgrimages. Of course there were other reasons for my leaving Manchester, but looking back now this seems to have been a probable cause.

From 2nd to 9th August 2006 I went around by coach on a British Explorer ticket. Then I went to the Outer Hebrides, namely at Caloway and Garenin. I was back from the island on 11th August and stayed at Rhenigidale. I got a lift to Gairloch where I stayed on 12th August, and on 13th August the same lift landed me in Lake District. I explored Cumbria until 19 August 2006. Between 22nd August and 3rd September

2006 I walked the Pennine Way, then from 5th until 8th September the Hadrian's Wall. During 11–14 September I helped with some works at Scargill House. From 17th until 26th September I walked the Offa's Dyke Path. Thereafter for one month my pilgrimage led me to Oxford, Cambridge, London and the area around them, and to the Stonehenge.

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The UK and Siam

<i>SPT Greek</i>	<i>Encyclopaedia Britannica</i>	<i>English</i>
<i>Euthyphrwn</i>	<i>Euthyphrōn</i>	Euthyphro
<i>Apologia Swkratous</i>	<i>Apologia Sōkratous</i>	Apology
<i>Kritwn</i>	<i>Critōn</i>	Crito
<i>Phaidwn</i>	<i>Phaedōn</i>	Phaedo
<i>Kratulos</i>	<i>Cratylōs</i>	Cratylus
<i>Theaitytos</i>	<i>Theaetētōs</i>	Theaetetus
<i>Sophistys</i>	<i>Sophistēs</i>	Sophist
<i>Politikos</i>	<i>Politikōs</i>	Statesman
<i>Parmenidys</i>	<i>Parmenidēs</i>	
<i>Philybos</i>	<i>Philēbos</i>	Philebus
<i>Sumposion</i>	<i>Symposion</i>	Symposium
<i>Phaidros</i>	<i>Phaedros</i>	Phaedrus
	<i>Alkibiadēs</i>	Alcibiades
	<i>Hipparchos</i>	Hipparchus
	<i>Erastai</i>	Lovers
	<i>Charmidēs</i>	
	<i>Lachēs</i>	
	<i>Lysis</i>	
	<i>Euthydēmos</i>	Euthydemus
	<i>Prōtagoras</i>	
	<i>Gorgias</i>	
	<i>Menōn</i>	Meno
	<i>Hippias Meizōn</i>	Hippias Major
	<i>Hippias Elattōn</i>	Hippias Minor
	<i>Iōn</i>	
	<i>Menexenos</i>	Menexenus
	<i>Politeia</i>	Republic
	<i>Timaeos</i>	Timeaus
	<i>Critias</i>	
	<i>Nomoi</i>	Laws
	<i>Epinomis</i>	

Table 1 list of Plato's works

Euthyphrwn

Problem 1. What is holiness, what unholiness?

§

Problem 2. By which things are all holy acts holy?

§

Problem 3. Is everything that is holy right, everything right holy?

§

Plato leads us through discussions by which a conclusion is arrived that holiness and things that all gods love are different. We also find that reverence implies fear, but not the other way round, that is fear does not necessarily imply reverence. In other words reverence is a subset of fear.

Similarly odd number implies number, but not number odd number, since odd number is a subset of number.

Apologia

Wisdom is not saying you know when you know not.

When a leader is ousted out no matter how popular he might once be it is because the sentiment risen against him from the mass not by the doing of any particular person, though the latter may have done it. Likewise in an assassination the assassin has far less to do with the cause than with the brutal action conducted.

Socrates knew how it was not his archenemy but the people that were rising against him.

... , that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Myletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many.

Injuring a man unjustly you injure yourself. Soul is more important than money. If you fight for the right and want to preserve your life for a while, then be a private citizen not a public man.

More than answers, the question is more important. Until you know what holiness is, do not prosecute anyone. On the other hand, you can never know what holiness is.

Socrates was speaking to a Roman soldier, and he said to him thus, 'You follow men's commands, why do you not follow God's regardless of fear and danger?'

'I do not do it for money,' he said, 'poverty is my witness.'

'I am convinced I have intentionally done no one wrongs, but I can not make you convinced.'

No one know death. Yet we fear death, what we do not know. Do not presume to know what you do not. Do not fear death.

He was being prosecuted, and said to his friend, 'I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.'

Crito

I think Plato thinks that the state is god, and that we belong in it.

Similar to what Shakespeare said, Plato also tells us that sometimes we need to change our mind on certain things in order to find ourselves. Shakespeare put it this way in *Love's Labour's Lost* (Act 4, Scene 3),

Let us once lose our oaths to find ourselves,
Or else we lose ourselves to keep our oaths.

It is better to die virtuous than to live in shame.
Then, Crito, let it be, and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us.

Phaedo

Philosophy is the study about death, and dying.

Theorem 1. Soul exists.

Proof.: Things are generated from their opposites. Therefore the living is generated from the dead. Therefore soul exists. \square

Learning is recollection. But instincts exist. Hence souls exist.

Plato argued that the sense of equality and absolutes is acquired before birth. Souls, through pleasures are captured by the body and part with the communion with the divine, pure and absolute. We should behold that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion. He asked whether we are inferior to swans who sing best when they are about to die.

Souls are like men, bodies clothes. Both wear out several of the other after a while.

One should argue after the truth, not to protect one's opinions.

Knowledge is a recollection.

Is soul a kind of harmony? Can we make an analogy lyre-harmony and body-soul? Harmony comes after a lyre, and gone before it. Is it true likewise that the soul arrives after the body and departs before it? Since souls may oppose bodies, therefore such analogy is not possible. Also, harmony may have degrees, that is there can be more or less of it whereas souls are equal. The oneness of souls implies perpetual harmony.

The trouble with literal argument is that the language, the wordings are sometimes tricky. Perhaps a way out of this is to use mathematics, with its strict definitions, and to use physics, with its quantitative style of study.

People usually worry themselves with things instead of with the

power which drives them.

There exist absolutes, things are beautiful because of beauty they contain.

All things have their opposites. Nothing admits its opposite. Soul causes life, as number one address. So the opposite of soul is death. Therefore soul does not admit death, that is to say, the soul is immortal.

Questions still remain after Plato. For instance, is it a mere matter of personification, of souls shunning those souls who had done wrong? Since all souls are equal and never evil, does death free them from the world and from earthly guilts?

Water encompasses fish. The earth encompasses water. The universe encompasses the earth. Then the soul encompasses the universe. The soul live much longer than the earth, as long as the universe. Then is there a higher soul yet encompassing it? And then God encompasses everything.

I think this has an influence on C. S. Lewis's Trilogy, namely *The Cosmic Trilogy*, comprising *Out of the Silent Planet* (1938), *Perelandra* (1943) and *That Hideous Strength* (1938).

When it comes to morals and the segregation of souls Plato switches suddenly to myths, for example that about Tartarus and Achenon, even though he also said that he did not mean it literally. I find such idea of merits and rewards still pagan.

And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough.

'Is heaven the universe?', I asked myself. If so, limbo must be the diffusion time to join it.

We may not live in vacuum of space but that is where our soul belong. Therefore we fear God, but our souls rejoice in Him. The reunion of the goods and the bads means a punishment for the latter but a reward for the former.

In his story Phaedo represents all our worldly life.

If you take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you do, ...

Compare this with what Buddha said (*cf Buddhapada* 166).

Cratylus

Names are what the gods call things, for example 'gene' and so on. There is a difference between *true* names and *word* names. Definitions are true names.

The question Plato presents here is an extremely interesting one, even though some of the investigations are rather naive.

Plato talks about some words in Greek. There is a word 'daímon-es', which means 'wise and knowing'. There is another word 'daímon-es', which means 'spirits'. The word 'ýrws' means 'hero' In its Attic form it is 'heros', and in Ionic 'HRWS'. The word 'érws' means 'love'. Its Ionic form is 'ERWS'. Definition is association, association of words. Thus it is that through the facade of etymology Plato discusses serious things.

According to Plato there are words which are considered elemental, which are the origin of all names. These words are also imitation, but of neither shape, sound, nor colour. One could present these elemental words by letters, and then combine them into other words. What we have is then a construction of a systematic language.

Plato said that 'f', 'ps' and 's' represent violent movements. Further 'd' means binding, 't' rest, 'l' gliding movement, 'n' internal, 'a' greatness, 'y' length, and 'o' round. The idea being looked at here is now a well developed information coding in coding theory. We have here, however, informing names.

Lawgivers make definitions. Pictures can be either like or unlike, in other words either correct or wrong. Similarly names can be either seeming or unseeming, that is either true or false. Since both names and laws are words, therefore some lawgivers are good and others bad.

Words are, however, but images, which are not to be exactly the same as the things they themselves represent. Plato presents the following question.

... the image must not by any means reproduce all the qualities of that which it imitates, if it is to be an image?

A name must be different from the thing, or else they would be duplicates of thing not a thing and its name. Thus there are different degrees of correctness of words, and hence of clauses and sentences. Also there are primary names and composite names.

Correctness and trueness are mere convention. Custom and conventions play a role in correctness of names.

Socrates talks about *amathía* (ignorance), and contrasts it with *toû âma theōi ióntos poreía* (the progress of one who goes with God).

How is reality to be learnt and discovered? Since all things are changing, therefore it is better to learn from the actual things in terms of their absolute qualities than to learn from their names.

The following sounds uncannily like a precursor to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in Quantum Mechanics.

Pws oún àn eíy ti ekeíno ò mydépotē wsáutws échei?

How, then, can that which is never in the same state be anything?

Ἄμα γὰρ àn epiónτος toû gnwsoménou állo kaì alloíon gígnōito
ýste ouk àn gnwstheíy éti opoión gé tí estin ý pws échon; gnwsis
dè dýpou oudemía gignwskei ò gignwskei mydamws échon.

For at the moment when he who seeks to know it approaches, it becomes something else and different, so that its nature and state can no longer be known; and surely there is no knowledge which knows that which is in no state?

'Geometry or any other form of philosophy?' Geometry is mathematics is philosophy, therefore to Plato mathematics is philosophy.

Socrates is the questioning in us! It is said that he did not exist as a person as such. May be this is true, and he could represent the critical thinking in us. As a testimony to this, those leaving him earlier than they should found bad companies, and so on. He makes minds pregnant in labour and, 'the delivery is due to the god and me.'

Socrates complained, 'they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth.'

'You could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything' Compare this with Jesus's 'judge not!', and Buddha's 'no *ditṭhi*!'

'Nothing ever is, but is always learning.' This is search and research, as Buddha had taught in his Kalamasutra and in his saying against *ditṭhi* (opinion). 'Ésti mèn gàr oudépot' oudén, aèi dè gígnetai.'

Looking at Plato's argument, then Swkratys (Socrates) is the questionings and critical thinking. Eukleidys, Terpsiwn, Theodwros and Theaitytos are all within him. Compare this with the Me in Christ in God. In the point of view of Plato perhaps it is the Me in Socrates in God. But since the questioning of an inquisitive mind can never exceed the boundary of knowledge, that is to say, reality and universe, whereas God could, we could combine these two statements to make the Me in Socrates in Christ in God. Here the Me is limited to within the Soul, Socrates is bounded by an initiative limit, Christ is bounded by the boundary of knowledge, namely the universe and the limit of our comprehension, and God is the Superset.

'Nothing is which appears.' Compare this with Shakespeare's 'nothing is but what is not.' We have no proof whether this is wakefulness or a dream.

There are only unions of things, no definite being or becoming.

'None of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me.' The questions belong to humanity, the solutions to us.

Is knowledge the same as perception? Our Socrates led us on our way to answer this question. We remember even when we no longer see the things, therefore knowledge and perception are different. Furthermore, if perception and knowledge are the same, then we are led to all sorts of contradiction, for example if we shut one eye then we must be at the same time both knowing and not knowing. But our memory of having felt something is not the same as the time when we felt it. Therefore it is possible to both know and not know at the same time.

The Socrates in us should be impersonal. The solutions we arrive at are our brainchild.

'But he is dead, and we are abusing the orphan.' The father is

dead, leaving an orphan defenceless. The guardians refuse to help. We refuters must do so in the name of justice. (Compare this to Shakespeare's *Sonnets*)

What is the difference between a philosopher and a lawyer? A philosopher is free and at leisure whereas a lawyer is in a hurry.

God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous.

'Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched.'

Trueness may not vary from person to person, else if A says, 'I am true and you are true' while B says, 'I am true but you are false', then A would be false.

The ancient says, 'the origin of all things is Ocenus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest'. Melissus and Parmenides says, 'everything is one and stationary within itself.' '*Sthñon akinyton teléthein wi pánt' ónom' eînai*', 'so that it is motionless, the name of which is the All.'

The above argument shows juxtaposition between 'the whole' and 'flowing'. Both seem to be correct, that is flowing within the whole. In other words, the concept of the whole is correct so long as we keep in mind that it is not static but dynamic.

There are two kinds of motion, that is alteration and motion in space. Perception and the percipient are active, whereas the perceived and quality are passive. Is movement when the passive becomes percipient, but not perceptive, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality?

Are all things in flux? If so and if perception is knowledge, then knowledge is not-knowledge.

What is opinion, what is false opinion? '*Autò déixeî*', 'the event itself will show.' Opinion comes with persuasion, whereas knowledge comes with teaching. True opinions are no knowledge. Take judges as an example, they may be persuaded without being taught.

Knowledge is true opinion together with reason. Primal elements

are perception, so they are truth but no knowledge. Compound things could be either true opinion or knowledge, so they are both truth and knowledge.

The whole is different from all, for we know names but not the letters.

This is the question of existence, the same question of 'to be or not to be.' We may know what a code stands for, but do we really understand each letter of the alphabet used to make up the words of the code? We know things, but not the Creator. In other words, we know God, but not all things He creates.

Is 'all' in the singular the same as 'all' in the plural? *'Tà dé ge pánta méry tò pân êinai wmológytai, éiper kai ọ pās arithmòs tò pân éstai'*, 'but we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all.' *'Tò ólon ár' ouk éstin ek merôn, pân gàr àn éiy tà pánta òn méry'*, 'then the whole does not consist of parts for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.'

'Knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others.'

Sophist

A part of Art is acquisitive. A part of acquisitive art is coercive. A part of coercive art is called hunting.

Things can be for the body or for the soul. Examples of those for the soul are arts.

Plato looks at the definitions of Sophists, statesmen and philosophers.

All badness comes from stupidity (thinking one knows when one does not). Thus the remedy is education, and the heart of education cross-questioning.

'Not-being' is absurd and should exist in neither singular or plural. That not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself.

'That which is not!' 'Defeated in the refutation of not-being.'

Yet Plato's *not-being* is but an abstraction of the physical idea of number. One could say it is a grammatical number. As mathematics it belongs to a language, not the physical world. So long as Euclid's *point* with no dimensions, *line* with one and only one dimension, and *plane* with exactly two dimensions exist, so could our *not-being*.

Thus Sophists, who are image-makers, are difficult to refute.

Who say that images are not-being? Images are created beings, that is things.

Not-being is an idea similar but more profound than, for instance, *no one*. In the case of the latter one could imagine *someone* is there, and then take that someone out. The space remaining there is therefore that *no one*. In other words it is a complementary self. Similar *nothing* is no *not-being* but a *not-a-thing*.

Parmenides

Stranger: In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

‘Ou gàr mý pote toûto damýi, physín, eínai mý eónta; allà sù týsd’ aph’ oðoû dizýmenos eírge nóyma’, ‘never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is; but keep your mind from this way of investigation.’

Could *not-being* be on the same par with false words, false opinion, image, likeness, imitation and appearance? Trying to disprove one’s own theory, say the both being and not-being are. But the both are being, and no not-being at all.

In addition to what Plato said, could not-being be considered as being neither thing nor space, nor no-space, nor no-non-space? But then again the word ‘being’ we used preceding the ‘neither’ has betrayed us somewhat. Shakespeare would have said, ‘and nothing is but what is not.’ What is a thing but atoms plus space. What is an atom but nucleids plus space. What is nucleids but quarks plus space, and so on.

Are we merely names of the same thing? (that is being?) The names are merely names of names.

‘Xenos Eleatys: *Kaì tò én ge, enòs ó, noma òn kaì toû onómatos aû tò én ón*’, ‘*An Elean Stranger:* And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.’ *One* is both the name of unity and also the unity of which the word ‘one’ is the name.

One implies parts, yet one must be absolutely without parts. Being identified by unity, the all will be more than one, else if absolute whole exists, the being lacks something of being. Then the being is not-being, since it is deprived of being. If the whole does not exist at all, the being could not have ever come into existence.

Adding to what Plato has said, nothing less than the All is anything. If we look at an aggregate of particles, ultimately no boundaries are definable. God is a distributed system and we are also distributed systems. Is the body fluid in us us, fluids in our cells us? What all

things are are but parts of All, with no meaningful boundaries definable.

Nothing apart from the whole can have quantity.

Plato discussed movement as against rest. In nowadays context we have Big Bang versus a stationary universe.

Discussing Sophist versus philosopher, Sophist is like darkness for they hardly see, whereas philosopher the brilliant light of the divine, 'for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.' Sophists look at not-being whereas philosophers at being. Furthermore, Sophists use practical and empirical methods whereas philosophers use ideas in their study.

In relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.

The prefix 'not-' indicates something different, not opposite.

The attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

God is the Superset.

The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.

The negative has only a relative existence and is not the opposite of the positive, but only differ from it. Not-being is one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

'Pháinetai gàr oûn problymátwn gémein', 'for he seems to have no end of defences.'

Let us look at the interrelationship between speech, opinion and image-making. Speech could be affirmative or negative, opinion true-ness or falsehood, and image-making likeness or fantastic. A Sophist is the imitator of a philosopher. Long speeches mark a statesman.

Politikos

Classes are parts. A statesman is a herder of harmless animal. Plato compares man with pig.

The Creator created and then left the universe alone. Entropy increases, and then the Pilot takes over.

But who is the Pilot but the Creator himself.

The universe runs forwards until it reaches an ultimate point from where it then reverses the direction. Then everything runs backwards, for example birth from the earth, and so on, until an absolute annihilation.

The art of weaving should include that of making weaving tools. The division becomes a mess if not impossible. Thus we could divide arts into contingent part, which provides tools, and actual part, which makes the thing.

The standard of the mean exists if and only if the art concerned exists. Greater and less are relative to one another and to the standard of the mean.

And, moreover, anyone who finds fault with the length of discourses in our discussions, or objects to roundabout methods, must not merely find fault with the speeches for their length and then pass them quickly and hastily by, but he must also show that there is ground for the belief that if they had been briefer they would have made their hearers better dialecticians and quicker to discover through reason the truth of realities.

The above passage may remind one of the case of the proof of the four-colour theorem.

Is everything that exists the instrument of something or another? Then in addition to Plato's discourse, is everything that exists the instrument of everything? The latter is added because it explains the idea of shared responsibility. All guilts committed by a person are shared by humanity as a whole.

Do all forms of government try to imitate a rule by a single ruler? Monarchy can be royalty or tyranny. It is the extreme case which could be best or worst. The rule of the few can be aristocracy or oligarchy. This is a moderate form of government. The rule of the many, that is democracy, can be lawful or lawless, as in mob rule. This is a weak form of government. It is worst in orderly time, best in chaotic one.

Both self-restraint and courage are subsets of virtue. At times they intersect each other. The weaving together of restraint and courage makes a statesman.

Parmenidys

'For you in your poems, say that the all is one?' Is existence one or many?

... and when it was written some one stole it, so that I could not even consider whether it should be published or not.

All things are one and many, but the one is not the many nor the many the one, that is to say, absolute one and many. In addition to Plato, infinity and one and zero are equivalent (absolute one and zero), and that is God. In other words, infinite field and trivial fields are the same.

An idea is one and the same, but is in many places at once, that is to say, it is in all its participants at the same time. This is like spreading a sail over many persons and say it was one, and all of it was over many. Only a part of an umbrella covers each thing. Thus a part is not the whole.

The one cannot be the many. Therefore it can have not parts. It also can have no beginning or end. That is to say, it is unlimited.

Is each idea one and distinct from concrete things? Ideas are thought, thought of something. That something is again an idea. Then is everything an idea?

Kephalos: Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that when Zeno said this he himself and Antiothenes and the rest begged Parmenides to show his meaning by an example and not to refuse.

The one is unlimited and *not at all*. It cannot be in anything, not even in itself. It cannot surround anything. It cannot move in space. Neither can it move in time. It can be in any time.

Adding to Plato, One is no singular, no plural, nothing. If we accept that God is Superset, then all these issues are solved, and so could we prove the One.

Next we look at being and unity. All parts are composed of these

two. Then the One, that is the Whole, comprises both being and unity. Hence the One must be infinite.

Additionally the One is the infinite of infinities. Being is a subset of other, that is the complement of one. So being differs from one by virtue of that other.

Now what about one and being one?

It seems there can be both without twoness, that is interspersed, undefinable boundary. Compare this with the Holy Spirit.

If one exists, then number exists. To see this we look at one and other, which make up a pair, that is to say, two. Next we could look at one, other and pair, and have then three. This leads us to all numbers.

If number exists, they must be infinite.

Thus Plato succeeded in reasoning how the existence of one implies the existence of infinite!

Existence, then, is distributed over all things, which are many, and is not wanting in any existing thing from the greatest to the smallest?

Yes, 'for how can existence be wanting in any existing thing?'

It is split up into the smallest and greatest and all kinds of existence; nothing else is so much divided, and in short the parts of existence are infinite.

'Its parts are the most numerous of all.'

Then unity is an attribute of every part of existence and is not wanting to a smaller or larger or any other part.

Plato looks at one and existence. One is as many as its parts, which is infinite, that is as many parts as existence's.

All the parts are in the whole, the whole not in any part.

For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all?

This is a solution to the Old Testament before Jesus gave us his. Also, one wonders whether the Greeks worked much with real numbers. Since they knew Pi and worked with geometry and Pythagoras, they must have known real numbers. But Plato's arguments seem to be based solely on integers. Perhaps his purpose is to make it simpler, and clearer to clarify things. Modern analysis seems to be influenced much by Plato's method.

The one was, is and will be.

In other words, Superset covers all time.

Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept which, we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all.

The one is different from the other, and vice versa. They are in the same state, that is like each other. We have now one, other, whole and all.

Therefore if one exists the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.

If one does not exist, then non-existent needs existence to continue being non-existent. The one needs existence to attain non-existence. That is the one has existence.

One can see therefore that the one both is and is not. Compare this with Shakespeare's 'to be or not to be.'

The non-existent one partakes no such attributes as greatness or smallness, likeness or difference, and so on.

This seems like trying to find whether God is the one or the non-existent one (not whether God exists or not, because the non-existent exists!) The non-existent one is different, but not to the one since that does not exist, then to each other lest it be others of nothing. They are fractions mutually different (not each one's, since one does not exist.) They appear one from a distance, at closer inspection infinite in number.

Is this the origin of epsilon and calculus?

'If the one is not, nothing is.'

Whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear.

‘If the others exist and the one does not, the others will be neither one nor many (for then, if none of them is one they are nothing at all.)’

My discovery that $\infty \equiv 1 \equiv 0$ was a rediscovery. And so was my pet definition of God as being the Superset. It can be disheartening when you read.

Philebus

Knowledge is good, but there are many forms of it, some of which oppose others.

Man is one, ox is one, the beauty is one, the good is one.

Prōton mēn eī tinas deī toiaútās eīnai monádas upolambánein alythōs oúsas; eīta pōs aū taútas, mían ekástyn oúsan aei tyn autyn kai mýte génesin mýte ólethron prosdechoményn, ómws eīnai bebaiótata mían taútyn; metà dē toút' en toīs gignoménōis aū kai apeírois eīte diespasményn kai pollà gegonuīan thetéon, eīth' olyn autyn autōs chwris, ò dy pántwn adunatútaton phaínoit' án, tautōn, kai èn āma en enī te kai polloīs gígnesthai.

The first question is whether we should believe that such unities really exist; the second, how these unities, each of which is one, always the same, and admitting neither generation or destruction, can nevertheless be permanently this one unity; and the third, how in the infinite number of things which come into being this unity, whether we are to assume that it is dispersed and has become many, or that it is entirely separated from itself – which would seem to be the most impossible notion of all – being the same and one, is to be at the same time in one and in many.

And we must not apply the idea of infinite to plurality until we have a view of its whole number between infinity and one; then, and not before, we may let each unit of everything pass on unhindered into infinity;

'Tà dē mésa autoūs ekpheúgei, oīs diakechwristai tó te dialecticōs pállin caì tò episticōs ymās poieísthai pròs allýlous toūs lógous', 'they disregard all that lies between the dialectic and the disputatious methods of discussion.'

Sound is one, and yet infinite in number, as in music and language. The origin of grammar was due to Theuth, perhaps an Egyptian, who divided sound in language into three group, namely vowel, semi-vowel and mutes. Then he divided each of these into primary units.

God creates the infinite, the finite, mixture of these, and the cause for this mixture.

Enjoyment or pleasure needs memory (past), opinion (present) and calculation (future). Desires are from the soul, the memory of fullness while the body is empty. Soul writes and paints into memory. There are true and false opinions. There are true and false pleasure. (Compare this with Buddha's 'no *ditthi*')

Laughing is a pleasure. Envy is a pain. But laughing at a friend's mistake shows envy, thus it is both pleasure and pain, that is an unpure pleasure.

To have knowledge is a pleasure. To lost the memory of knowledge is no pain. Therefore having knowledge is a pleasure without pain, that is pure pleasure.

Things can be either generation or good. Pleasure, for instance is no good, therefore it is a generation.

Arts can be either exact or approximate. Building, for example, is exact whereas music is approximate, that is you use your guess and experience. Arithmetic is a most exact art. It has two types, that of the people and that of philosopher.

Are there two kinds of knowledge, that is to say, pure and impure? If we contemplate on this question, knowledge of those things which are transitory is less pure, that is impure. On the other hand knowledge of things which neither come into being nor pass away is considered pure.

Plato discusses mind, pleasure and truth, and put things into five groups, namely first, measure, moderation and fitness, second, proportion, beauty, perfection and sufficiency, third, mind and wisdom, fourth, science, arts, true opinions (that is those of the soul), and fifth, pure pleasure.

Sumposion

Ca lws g', éphy, poiwn sú; allà poú éstin oûtos?

'Very good of you to come,' he said, 'but where is the man?' (It's good of you to come, Agathon, but where is Socrates? ~ Aristodemus)

'My own is but meagre, as disputable as a dream.' Socrates is the systematic questioning.

They were at a party last night. Our Socrates stays not with us when we revel.

Love is of the most venerable standing. The power of love, 'only such as are in love will consent to die for others.' One could die for love, or sleep on doorsteps.

Two kinds of love are heavenly love and popular love. For trial of lovers, a quick capitulation is a disgrace. Also lovers are disgraced if surrender from poll, public preferment, or cowering from the endurance of ill-treatment. Compare this discussion of Plato with Shakespeare's *Sonnets*, which are about the love of writers. For the love of teachers Plato gives the following.

And he will be deemed a good practitioner who is expert in producing Love, where it ought to flourish but, exists not, and in removing it from where it should not be.

'The one at variance with itself is drawn together, like harmony of bow or lyre.' ~ Hera Cleitus

The universe is held together by the strain of opposite forces.

All means of communion between gods and men, are only concerned with either the preservation or the cure of Love.

Love conceived as a single whole exerts a complete power both here on earth and in heaven above. Love for money, even when it turned out there was no money from our love, is no less disgrace. Love for spiritual improvement of the beloved, even when it is betrayed, is no less honourable.

Poetry is the art of composing, which in turn is anything passing from not being into being. All craftsmen are poets.

Love is all that desire of good things and of being happy. Every man should honour Love.

‘One learnt leech is worth the multitude.’ ~ Homer ~

A man sensible and resolute, ‘he was far more proof against money on every side than Ajax against a spear.’

Socrates always shows bravery in battles, uses one word for the same thing, and gives only sensible speeches.

A fully skilled tragedian could be a comedian as well.

Phaedrus

Passion obscures judgement. Lover thinks grievous things that cause no pain to others, and praises what ought not to give pleasure.

‘The good things are not the same as the pleasant, nor the bad as the painful.’

The discourse was not only wonderful but miraculous. That was forcing Socrates to make a discourse by threatening to read no more.

Here Plato starts from a definition of love and refer to it constantly throughout.

He ought never to have accepted a lover who was necessarily without reason, but rather a reasonable non-lover; for otherwise he would have to surrender himself to one who was faithless, irritable, jealous, and disagreeable, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical condition, and most harmful by far to the cultivation of his soul, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything of higher importance in truth either in heaven or on earth.

‘The fondness of the lover is not a matter of good will, but of appetite which he wishes to satisfy.’

‘Ὡς λύκοι ἀρν ἀγαπῶσι’, ὥς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί’, ‘just as the wolf loves the lamb, so the lover adores his beloved.’

But their foolishness was really funny besides, for while they were saying nothing sound or true, they put on airs as though they amounted to something, if they could cheat some mere manikins and gain honour among them.

Is Socrates a set of people, or a set of questions by various people you talk with?

Madness, which comes from god, is superior to sanity, which is of human origin.

When ‘distress and the greatest troubles’ visit us ‘through some

ancient guilt', madness, taking refuge in prayers, 'he who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time.'

'A third kind of madness comes from the Muses.' This 'arouses the soul to songs and poetry, by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations.'

Ὅς δ' ἂν ἀνευ μαρίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκοιτο, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελὴς αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ ποίσις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαϊνομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ὑφανίσθη.

'But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madness.'

And our proof will not be believed by the merely clever, but will be accepted by the truly wise.

The soul is ungenerated and immortal. The proof of this is given as follows. Soul is ever moving, not moved but itself moving. Therefore it is at the beginning of generation, thereby not generated.

Perhaps soul is the God in us, and perhaps soul, Holy Spirit and God are synonyms.

'But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities.'

For I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colourless, the formless, and intangible truly existing essence with which all true knowledge is concerned holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul.

Soul is with God, and somehow is detached from Him.

I think soul is never detached from God, since God is the Superset.

'And when they have come away they feed upon opinion', lose their wings and fall to the ground, enter human the order of whom is,

1. a philosopher or a lover of beauty
2. a lawful king or a warlike ruler
3. a politician, a man of business, or a financier
4. a hard-working gymnast or those who cure the body

5. a prophet or those who conduct mystic rite
6. a poet or some other imitative artist
7. a craftsman or a husbandman
8. a Sophist or a demagogue
9. a tyrant

Souls may pass from man to beast and from beast to man.

For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul, once beheld, when it journeyed with God.

‘The mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine.’ He is initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect, ‘separate himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is rebuked by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he is inspired.’

This fourth kind of madness, ‘when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below.’

He who loves the beautiful, partaking in this madness, is called a lover.

Pure light, ‘not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell.’